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The first question is whether decumulation 
is something that actually needs any 
policy attention. Since the answer to that 
question here is a qualified yes, the next 
part of this article outlines a number of 
decumulation methods, considering such 
matters as cost, risk and flexibility. The 
desirability of any form of decumulation 
to individuals will naturally vary 
according to their preferences in respect 
of those points. The article concludes by 
positing some public good components 
in respect of each decumulation method, 
and setting out some possible government 
interventions in response. 
Decumulation 101 
the basics of drawing  
down capital in  
retirement 
Introduction
Decumulation in the retirement income context is the using 
up of retirement savings by way of drawing out regular 
income – for example, a fixed amount each month. It’s the 
converse of accumulating retirement savings while in paid 
work by regularly putting money aside. And return on 
investment plays its part in both: in the accumulation phase 
it enhances the amount saved; in the decumulation phase it 
enhances the regular amount that can be paid out.
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Overall, the object of the article 
is to introduce readers to the policy 
questions at a fairly high level, and there 
will be no in-depth research quoted; 
academic references are unashamedly in 
short supply. Readers are left to identify 
research possibilities for themselves. 
Relevance
For most people, life experience up to 
retirement does not teach how to manage 
retirement savings assets for financial 
support thereafter. Investment of savings 
is mostly left to experts. At best, many aim 
to live on the income generated by those 
assets after retirement, and leave the assets 
for their heirs. At worst they spend the lot, 
which may have its attractions but doesn’t 
usually result in anything sustaining for 
the rest of life.
The lack of acquired competence in 
managing financial assets for income 
could be seen as already sufficient reason 
for paying attention to decumulation 
policy. But provision of regular income is 
only one use of retirement savings, and a 
number of conflicting objectives need to 
be reconciled. Some questions individuals 
need to ask themselves as they withdraw 
from paid work are:
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•	 What	debts	would	it	be	sensible	
to pay off, so as to save making 
repayments out of my retirement 
income? 
•	 What	amount	of	assets	do	I	want	
to hold as ‘rainy day’ money against 
shocks (such as needing urgent 
medical treatment not available 
quickly in the public health system) 
or some planned major expenditure, 
such as travel or replacing a car?
•	 Is	there	some	bequest	I	want	to	
make?
•	 Apart	from	my	‘retirement	savings’	
assets, what other assets do I have: 
for example, a house?
•	 Is	all	the	income	generated	from	my	
assets available to be spent, or do I 
want to put some aside to protect the 
real value of my intended bequests?
These questions lead to identification 
of the assets one wants to hold on to, 
and for how long. In turn this leads to 
determination of how much, if any, will 
be available to be run down through 
decumulation to provide additional 
income on top of:
•	 investment	income	from	the	assets	
planned to be retained (rather than 
run down), including rents;
•	 New	Zealand	Superannuation	when	
eligible;
•	 any	private	pension;	
•	 earnings	from	continued	paid	
workforce participation, including 
self-employment. 
There may well be trade-offs needed 
between the level of total regular income 
one would like to have and how much 
one wants to retain for bequests and/or 
rainy day money (and hence not available 
for decumulation).
For those with little retirement 
savings and no freehold house, such 
assessment may lead to the conclusion 
that decumulation is not relevant to them: 
access to some financial assets can often 
make a significant difference to welfare 
after retirement, providing resilience 
to financial shocks. For those more 
financially advantaged the assessment 
is not straightforward. One problem is 
that the income one might generate from 
decumulating some savings can be hard 
to quantify. (The Sorted website of the 
Commission for Financial Literacy and 
Retirement Income could help here, but 
would need to be able to reference and 
quantify decumulation products.) 
Nonetheless, decumulation products 
have the potential to be very useful, 
particularly for those with minimal 
bequest intentions. And, without wanting 
to sound excessively paternalistic, it may 
be no bad thing to have some assets 
assigned to providing income and not at 
risk to financial predators. Among other 
things, cognitive failure is more of a risk 
with greater age.
Decumulation methods
The decumulation methods discussed 
here are:
1. Financial adviser as manager
2. Lifetime annuity
3. Pooled annuity funds
4. Drawdown ‘pension’
5. Term annuity
6. Drawdown ‘pension’ or term annuity 
plus deferred annuity
7. Home equity release.
For each I describe salient features, 
pricing issues, relative advantages and 
disadvantages, and, where relevant, tax 
issues for neutrality. Tax neutral treatment 
is taken as tax at the applicable individual 
rate on income (interest, dividends and 
rent in this context) and no tax on any 
drawdown of capital. 
Financial adviser as manager
This is employing a person on an ongoing 
basis to manage the drawdown of 
retirement assets. This seems ideal. There 
should after all be a number of people 
who have an excellent knowledge of the 
financial products on the market, and who 
also understand how to communicate and 
engage with their clients in order to explain 
the risks and rewards of different scenarios. 
There are, however, two large problems 
with entrusting retirement wealth to 
an adviser. One is cost. On a person-
to-person basis, if you have moderate 
wealth then it is very expensive relative to 
assets to engage a financial adviser other 
than short-term, and not always just 
then. Commission-based remuneration 
disguises this cost, but does not align the 
interests of the adviser and the client.
The other problem is competence. It 
has been said of financial advisers that 
those who can, work on their own account, 
and those who can’t, advise. Whether one 
agrees with that or not, what is inescapable 
is that a poor adviser can cost clients 
dearly through their naivety or inability, 
let alone any fraudulent behaviour. 
Although regulation of advisers has 
improved over the last decade, there is still 
no real basis on which to assess who will 
do a good job and who will not. Hence, 
although there are doubtless some very 
good practitioners and a number who are 
reasonably competent, getting a financial 
manager who is not up to scratch puts at 
risk the whole of one’s savings.
There is little scope to reduce the 
cost of direct, ongoing financial advice. 
One could observe that on average 
a financial adviser is less likely to do 
damage to a client’s savings than the 
client themselves, and that this has 
value. How much, however, is disputable. 
And adviser competence issues remain: 
poor performance has catastrophic and 
unrecoverable effects.
The lifetime annuity
This is the most traditional form of 
decumulation. An insurer, by pooling 
mortality risk over a sufficiently large 
number of annuitants, can offer to provide 
Although regulation of advisers has 
improved over the last decade, there is 
still no real basis on which to assess who 
will do a good job and who will not.
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a fixed monthly amount for life in return 
for a lump sum. The insurer also effectively 
provides a guaranteed investment return. 
The working of an annuity is not, however, 
at all transparent. Determining how 
much monthly payment can be made for 
a given lump sum depends on projecting 
annuitant mortality (rather lighter than 
population mortality), investment return 
and expenses, and incorporating a profit 
margin for the cost of the capital held for 
solvency purposes. So annuities remove 
mortality, investment and expense risk 
in respect to the payments the annuitant 
is due to receive, but in doing this are 
more expensive to provide than a simple 
analysis would suggest. 
On the demand side, potential 
annuity purchasers have difficulty with 
the prospect that if they die early, no 
refund of the unexpended part of the 
purchase price is available. One can try 
to explain that this is the result of risk-
pooling and someone has to pay for those 
who live longer than average, but the 
downside risk does predominate. And, of 
course, there is no flexibility, no facility to 
change the arrangement to cope with an 
unexpected call on funds.
In terms of taxation, the aim should 
be neutrality for the individual. It is 
possible, although complex, for tax to be 
attributed to individuals by reference to 
the balance remaining of their purchase 
price, plus investment return credited to 
date, net of all expenses, plus the share of 
fall-in from deceased annuitants. Since it 
would be impossible to set prices based 
on projecting future individual tax rates, 
neutrality requires the insurer to pay no 
tax on its annuity business (other than 
profit, as it emerges) and the annuitants to 
be taxed directly on attributed investment 
income each year.
A useful approximation in place of 
annual attribution is to identify one half 
of an annuity payment as income: this 
may be acceptable on the basis that, very 
broadly, half of the total payout over 
an average lifetime will be investment 
income and half will be return of capital. 
(The precise split depends on the level 
of investment income earned.) Note that 
this approximation takes relatively more 
from those who live longer on average 
compared to those who die early. 
Pooled annuity funds
These are an attempt to reduce the cost 
(i.e. improve the annuity payout) of 
the lifetime annuity. The administrator 
operates a pooled fund for mortality and 
investment risk, but does not provide 
any guarantees. The initial annuity is 
estimated based on applicable mortality 
and anticipated net investment return 
(and expenses), but annuity amounts 
may be reset each year based on actual 
experience. The administrator profit 
is usually derived from the investment 
activity.
Normally, lifetime annuity pricing 
is based on the best expected longevity 
(unless annuitisation is compulsory). 
Pooled annuity funds are voluntary, but 
could be segregated and, by making use 
of insurance risk assessment processes, 
pool those with poorer longevity 
prospects. However, attracting enough 
people to make this viable on a voluntary 
basis appears difficult. Indeed, while 
theoretically attractive, pooled annuity 
funds appear to have obtained even less 
traction than life annuities. Likely reasons 
include the downside risk of loss of 
some capital outweighing the continued 
payment, and absence of a tradition 
of such funds. Obtaining neutral tax 
treatment again has the same issues as 
with the lifetime annuity. The only real 
advantage of pooled annuity funds over 
lifetime annuities is the absence of a 
requirement for regulatory capital, and 
therefore potentially higher annuities for 
the same purchase price.
Drawdown ‘pension’
While the lifetime annuity pools 
mortality and investment risk (and 
expense risk), the drawdown pension 
works on an individual approach. There 
are variations, but the basic approach 
is for a regular payout to be calculated 
based on the amount deposited, expected 
investment return and expenses, and the 
pensioner’s preferred payment period. 
Operationally, a pension account is 
established, investment return credited, 
and pension payments and expenses 
debited. Tax is – or should be – paid 
by the pensioner on the net investment 
income credited. When no money is left, 
payments cease. If the pensioner dies 
before running out of funds the balance 
goes to the heirs.
Were the period set to life expectancy 
– the average period a person is expected 
to live – then, assuming investment 
returns and expenses match the estimates, 
half the pensioners will run out of funds 
before they die. For this reason a longer 
payment period may be favoured: for 
example, to the point where 70–75% of 
people will have died. Conversely, people 
who consider they are in poor health, or 
who have other resources for later in life, 
may prefer a period less than the average 
lifespan.
Because funds are held in individual 
accounts the facility of lump sum 
withdrawals can be provided, with 
a reset of the monthly pension. The 
administrator, however, will need to 
charge those who avail themselves of this 
appropriately, since not only are there 
administrative costs, but also implications 
for investment policy if higher liquidity 
may be needed.
Costs of the pension will include 
investment charges and administration, 
as well as a profit charge (although little 
Were the period set to life expectancy – the 
average period a person is expected to live – 
then, assuming investment returns and 
expenses match the estimates, half the 
pensioners will run out of funds before they 
die.
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regulatory capital is needed), basically 
for providing an investment service. 
Drawdown pension arrangements can 
offer a variety of investment allocation 
strategies, particularly for longer planned 
drawdown periods; the deduction from 
gross income for investment charges (and 
profit) should be transparent, but may 
not always be so.
While the greater flexibility and capital 
protection are attractive, drawdown 
accounts can be depleted for the longer-
lived, potentially giving rise to a non-
anticipated fall in living standards. Poor 
investment returns compared to those 
anticipated in setting the drawdown 
amount may curtail the actual period 
of receipt (although the converse, better 
returns, will extend it).
Term annuity
A term annuity is a series of regular 
payments for a fixed term. Unlike a 
lifetime annuity, payment continues if 
the annuitant dies before the end of the 
fixed term. Pricing, therefore, does not 
need to include mortality projections. 
The advantage of a term annuity over 
a drawdown pension is that the payout 
amounts are known: there is effectively an 
investment guarantee. Conversely, there is 
no flexibility in terms of access to lump 
sums. And, like drawdown, the payout 
may well stop before death, the likelihood 
of that depending on the term chosen.
Regulation requires ensuring adequate 
reserving, plus regulatory capital for the 
investment guarantee. A term annuity 
is likely, therefore, to be less than a 
comparable drawdown pension. Tax on 
investment return has the same issues as 
for a lifetime annuity.
Drawdown ‘pension’ or term annuity plus 
deferred annuity
From the discussion of decumulation 
methods so far, it will be noted that 
drawdown pensions have the greatest 
‘market’ appeal due to flexibility, but 
do carry the risk of reaching a certain 
point and running out of income. Term 
annuities have the same drawback. This 
suggests combining a drawdown pension 
arrangement or term annuity with a 
deferred annuity – that is, a lifetime 
annuity which doesn’t commence until 
age 80, for example, or even age 85 – in 
order that there is a guarantee of income 
in the later years if one survives past the 
drawdown period or comes to the end of 
the term annuity period.
A deferred annuity requires rather less 
regulatory capital in relation to mortality 
risk than an immediate annuity, because 
the guarantee period is quite a lot 
shorter. There does, of course, need to be 
regulation to ensure adequate reserves are 
held and that profits are not anticipated 
before they are earned. Nonetheless, 
deferred annuities are less capital-
intensive than full lifetime annuities, and 
should be more easily presented as direct 
insurance against living too long.
Purchase of a deferred annuity need 
not be associated with obtaining a 
drawdown pension or term annuity, but 
put together they offer the opportunity 
for retirement planning by harmonising 
the regular income from drawdown or 
fixed-term annuity and the deferred 
annuity (although there could be a hiatus 
if the drawdown funds run out before 
the deferred annuity kicks in). Note that 
the neutral tax treatment of deferred 
annuities presents the same issues as for 
immediate lifetime annuities
Home equity conversion
Home equity conversion is not strictly 
speaking a decumulation option itself, 
but the funds made available from 
releasing equity in the home can then 
be converted into an income stream, in 
one of the ways set out above. The most 
common form of home equity release, the 
reverse mortgage, advances money on the 
security of the home. Compound interest 
is payable on the advance, but the owner 
retains full entitlement to remain in the 
home. The advance and accumulated 
interest are recuperated when the owner 
dies or moves out, whichever occurs 
first. 
Reverse mortgage contracts usually 
have a no negative equity guarantee: that 
is, the total recoverable cannot exceed the 
current value of the house after expenses 
of sale. For this reason the maximum 
proportion of value that can be released 
takes into account mortality (including 
mortality improvement), likely interest 
charge, and likely increase in house prices 
for the kind of property in question.
It is understood that paying an advance 
as regular income has been considered 
by local home equity providers. There is 
no obvious reason why such providers 
could not offer a drawdown facility, and/
or make deferred annuities available 
through a registered insurer.
Public good issues
The argument here is that welfare in later 
life would be improved were greater use 
made of decumulation products. As 
discussed earlier, many people are not well 
equipped to manage retirement assets for 
decumulation purposes themselves; nor 
is it reasonable to expect them to upskill 
(assuming ability to do so). And having 
assets assigned to decumulation will also 
offer protection against fraud and loss of 
cognitive ability.
 The decumulation products described 
above are, however, either not widely 
available or in apparently low demand. 
In this situation, a three-pronged 
policy response in respect of education, 
standardisation and regulation (including 
tax) would do the following:
... many people are not well equipped 
to manage retirement assets for 
decumulation purposes themselves; nor 
is it reasonable to expect them to upskill 
(assuming ability to do so).
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Education would explain the 
advantages of decumulation, help 
people identify what assets (if any) 
could be used for decumulation, 
and identify the pros and cons 
of different options according to 
personal preferences in respect of 
risk, flexibility and cost.
Standardisation would be desirable 
in order that people not become 
bewildered by choice, and would help 
keep education initiatives focused. 
A comprehensive but limited option 
set can be a useful nudge as to what 
people should be looking at. It also 
enhances competition, as comparison 
of different providers is considerably 
simplified. Once the basics have 
been in place for a while, more 
sophistication can be introduced 
later.
Regulation is required to 
give confidence that, where a 
decumulation product provides 
guarantees, the purchaser can be 
confident that, in all reasonably 
foreseeable circumstances, those 
promises will be kept. It provides 
not only for reporting but also for 
monitoring and enforcement, where 
it is not reasonable to expect most 
clients to have the adequate skill or 
interest to do this themselves, and 
there is no gain for third parties 
to step in. Tax treatment would be 
neutral across options to avoid tax 
arbitrage affecting choice between 
products. Some concessional 
treatment could, however, be 
considered on a cost-benefit 
assessment where any particular 
decumulation product benefits the 
whole community. 
So what might this policy framework 
mean in respect of each decumulation 
method listed above?
Financial adviser as manager
What is being considered here is 
having someone manage the whole 
decumulation process through ongoing 
asset management, not just giving advice 
on decumulation products such as lifetime 
annuities, etc. One might consider that, as 
only the very wealthy would find such an 
approach cost-effective, no intervention is 
needed. However, the very wealthy are not 
necessarily all financially astute, and in any 
case some with lesser wealth might want 
to consider the possibility. For monitoring 
and regulation purposes, then, a policy 
option would be to maintain a register 
of qualified decumulation managers. 
Applicants would need to demonstrate 
fitness for the role, and to file reports 
on their activities and performance on 
behalf of their decumulation clients, with 
the registrar given a proactive role in 
monitoring. The aim would be to identify 
poor performance before it did too much 
damage; however, a performance guarantee 
fund, with levies tied to risk profiles, would 
also provide assurance to potential clients. 
Significant penalties for carrying out this 
business unregistered would be necessary to 
deter the unethical, and protect the brand. 
With this structure in place, education 
measures would be straightforward: 
describe the register, set out the 
requirements placed on those registered, 
and give an indication as to likely annual 
costs.
Lifetime annuity
While the benefits of these are 
appreciated by risk professionals, there 
is a corresponding lack of appreciation 
by laypeople. Education could assist, but 
there will remain distrust of insurers due 
to the opaque nature of the product. This 
can be addressed in part by improved 
regulation, including a review of currently 
applicable tax rules (also opaque); it 
would be helpful if tax treatment was 
demonstrably neutral. 
Ultimately, however, it is difficult to 
see how insurers can obtain a required 
return on capital without compulsory 
annuitisation, as there was in the 
UK until very recently. For example, 
government could require annuitisation 
of the subsidised element of KiwiSaver 
entitlements. If that is a step too far, and 
there are good arguments either way, 
then arguably there becomes a role for 
government to establish a state-owned 
annuity corporation to provide lifetime 
annuities, on market-failure grounds. 
Were this to occur, however, there will 
still be need for best-practice regulation 
(including for solvency capital) and best 
design practice: ideally automatic cost of 
living indexation, or at least some proxy 
such as annual 2% increases (i.e. at the 
broad inflation target rate).
Education initiatives to explain 
annuities, particularly the guarantees, 
would only be sensible if these other 
steps are taken – i.e. tax neutrality, sound 
regulation, and either some compulsion 
or the imprimatur of a government 
entity. 
Drawdown ‘pension’
This option is the most transparent and 
education can focus on how it works 
without too much difficulty. The key 
policy action is standardisation. What 
would be truly useful would be to require 
each KiwiSaver default provider to offer a 
drawdown pension arrangement with the 
following characteristics:
•	 a	standard	pension	based	on	
Statistics New Zealand population 
best-estimate mortality projections 
to last five years past life expectancy, 
 
The existence of properly costed and 
managed deferred annuities would allow 
retirees to decumulate initially using 
drawdown pensions and/or term annuities, 
protecting themselves against early death 
...
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and investment return based on the 
experience of the provider’s default 
portfolio, net of expenses;
•	 a	‘high’	pension	to	last	until	five	years	
before life expectancy; 
•	 calculation	of	pension	to	allow	
for automatic increases of 2% per 
annum;
•	 access	to	capital	on	full	cost	recovery,	
including a liquidity charge; and
•	 opportunity	to	reset	–	subject	to	a	
minimum monthly pension amount, 
since costs are similar per payment.
Regulation would fall under current 
KiwiSaver rules and scrutiny. While other 
forms of drawdown need not necessarily 
be barred, some form of branding should 
be used to establish the primacy of the 
standard versions, and other forms would 
need to be brought under KiwiSaver 
legislation.
Term annuity
This is in essence a bank product, since 
management principally concerns credit 
risk. One might consider requiring banks 
to offer a range of terms – 5, 10, 15 years 
– in return for government education 
initiatives so that retirees include these 
as options to consider. Certainly it would 
help retirees (and their advisers) to have 
an indication as to what they could obtain 
in this fashion.
Pooled annuity funds
While discussion of decumulation would 
have been incomplete without mentioning 
these, there does not seem any compelling 
reason to devote any further consideration 
to them here.
Drawdown ‘pension’ or term annuity plus 
deferred annuity
The deferred annuity can be seen as 
the missing piece of the puzzle, since it 
provides insurance against living longer 
than expected. One obvious drawback, 
however, is that by providing an income 
source, it could constrain access to welfare 
benefits such as the residential care 
subsidy. Certainly, where means testing 
focuses on income and excludes capital, 
treating a capital element as income would 
be disadvantageous.
These considerations suggest that a 
concessional tax treatment for deferred 
annuities might have direct welfare 
benefit savings, as well as being welfare-
enhancing in the wider sense. It would 
clearly be essential to ring-fence deferred 
annuities from other forms of annuity, 
and to have appropriate prudential 
regulation.
Whether or not the market-failure 
argument to have government offer 
lifetime annuities is accepted, the argu-
ment becomes stronger for deferred 
annuities, picking up the role of 
government as insurer of last resort. 
Whether this role could extend to 
inflation indexing is another point for 
investigation. Certainly the absence of 
any facility to obtain a good annuity 
product was regarded as an argument 
for being able to choose to defer New 
Zealand Superannuation payments.
The existence of properly costed 
and managed deferred annuities would 
allow retirees to decumulate initially 
using drawdown pensions and/or term 
annuities, protecting themselves against 
early death, and then have continued 
income if they survive past the point when 
the other two run out. The balance to put 
into a deferred annuity compared to that 
for drawdown or fixed term could be set 
according to preferences for continuing 
income: some might wish to target a 
level income; others a lower income in 
the deferral period, perhaps because they 
expect to be less active. The Sorted website 
would be very suitable in helping people 
investigate this for themselves, and the 
Commission for Financial Literacy and 
Retirement Income could no doubt run 
effective education campaigns to assist 
more comprehensive retirement income 
planning.  
Home equity release
Education here would have two aspects: 
letting people know that they have an 
income option through using one of 
the main decumulation approaches; 
and making sure that the costs of home 
equity release are understood. The 
dominance of one provider in the past has 
handicapped proper competition, with 
the profit margins – to the extent that 
these can be estimated – looking very high 
compared to those in more competitive 
jurisdictions, such as the UK. Again, it is 
moot whether the government needs to 
introduce competition by establishing its 
own provider, as it did with Kiwibank; 
a problem, however, could be finding 
enough credit. Were the government to 
get involved, it could reasonably require 
that proceeds be taken as drawdown or 
fixed-term plus deferred annuity – i.e. 
focus on income provision.
Recommendations
Provision of lifetime annuities has 
collapsed and no immediate replacement 
has occurred. Some government 
intervention could assist the development 
of the most promising option, the 
drawdown pension. Standardisation 
is strongly recommended to ensure 
good understanding through education 
initiatives and meaningful competition, 
leaving room to relax strictures when the 
method has better public understanding.
Deferred annuity provision is the 
natural complement to drawdown. Some 
people may not want that insurance, but 
for those who do there are currently no 
market products. Again, government 
intervention, including public education, 
appears necessary; in time this should 
lead to opportunity for private providers.
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